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MODERN THEOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL THEORY: A TALE OF IDEOLOGICAL COLLAPSE
t

John Warwick Montgomery
Abstract

This paper bridges an intellectualchasm often regardedas impassable, that
between modern jurisprudence (philosophy of law) and contemporary
theology. Ourthesis is that remarkablysimilardevelopmentalpatternsexist in
these two areas of the history of ideas and that lessons learned in the one are
of the greatestpotential value to the other. It will be shown that the fivefold
movement in the history of modern theology (classical liberalism, neoorthodoxy, Bultmannianexistentialism, Tillichianontology, andsecular/deathof-God viewpoints) has been remarkably paralled in legal theory
(realism/positivism,thejurisprudenceofH.L.A. Hart,the philosophyofRonald
Dworkin, the neo-Kantian political theorists, and Critical Legal Studies'
deconstructionism). From this comparative analysis the theologian and the

legal theorist can learn vitally important lessons for their own professional
endeavors.
I. INTRODUCTION

Ourfin de si&le-and, in this case, fin de milldnium-is characterized by
hyperspecialisation run riot. The computer nerd has no idea what is going on
outside his software and the rest of us have no clue as to what he is up to. In
academia, subject specialties operate like medieval fiefdoms, with little
understanding or appreciation of what is occurring elsewhere.

t Emeritus Professor of Law and Humanities, University of Bedfordshire, England;
Distinguished Research Professor of Apologetics and Christian Thought, Patrick Henry College,
Virginia, U.S.A.; and Director, International Academy of Apologetics, Evangelism & Human
Rights, Strasbourg, France. Ph.D., Chicago; D.Thdol., Strasbourg; LL.D., Cardiff; Dr. [h.c.],
Institute for Religion and Law, Moscow. Barrister-at-Law (England and Wales), Avocat (Paris),
Member of the California, District of Columbia, Virginia, Washington State, and U.S. Supreme
Court bars. Dr. Montgomery's legal specialty is the international and comparative law of
human rights and he regularly pleads religious freedom cases before the European Court of
Human Rights. He is a U.S. and U.K. citizen, the author of some fifty books in five languages
(www.ciltpp.com), and is included in Who's Who in America, Who's Who in France, the
European Biographical Directory, Who's Who in the World, and Contemporary Authors. This
essay was originally presented by invitation at the symposium Mere Theism: LiberatingTheistic
Scholarshipsponsored by Biola University, La Mirada, California, December 3-6, 1998, and
originally printed in JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, CHRIST OUR ADVOCATE (2002). Reprinted
with permission.
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In this paper an attempt will be made to bridge an intellectual chasm often
regarded as uncrossable: the chasm between law and religion, or, more
specifically for our purpose, that between modem jurisprudence (philosophy of
law) and modem theology. It is the conviction of this essayist that remarkable
parallels exist between these two areas in the history of ideas and that lessons
learned in the one are of the greatest potential value in the other.
II. A CENTURY OF DETERIORATING THEOLOGY

In my now historic debate with the late Resigned Bishop James Pike at
McMaster University, I argued that modem theology was engaging in a
systematic process of self-destruction. My remarks on that occasion were
captioned, "The Suicide of Christian Theology," and later comprised the first
chapter of my book of that title. I there developed an analogy, "The Parable of
the Engineers," to make my point: Christian theology was like a great cathedral,
constructed according to the design and plan of its Architect or Intelligent
Designer; but in our time the engineers, representing modem theological
schools of thought, have lost confidence in the original plans and have insisted
on going their own way, resulting ultimately in the collapse of the structure.
Thus did the great cathedral eventually crumble and fall, killing
not only the people who had loved it but also the engineers
responsible for its loss. Pathetically, there were a few engineers
who, right up to the moment of final destruction, still pleaded that
the only hope lay in following rigorously the original plans, that the
engineers must bring their stylistic ideas into conformity with the
architect's, and that deviations from their notions of style did not
constitute genuine errors or contradictions in the plans. But their
voices were scarcely heard amid the din of engineering teams
working at cross-purposes to each other, and the deafening roar of
falling masonry.
And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds
blew, and beat upon that cathedral; and it fell: and great was the fall
of it. I
My sad tale began with the rise of destructive biblical criticism in the
eighteenth century (Jean Astruc et al.) and the development of documentary
theories in the nineteenth (Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen on the "true" sources
of Old Testament writings-a subjective literary approach later to be applied to

1. JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, THE SUICIDE OF CHRisTIAN THEOLOGY 26-27 (1996).
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the New Testament by the advocates of forngeschichtliche Methode).
Grounded in evolutionary self-confidence as to inevitable human progress, such
dehistoricisings of biblical revelation evacuated the text of de facto binding
force, opening the possibility (nay, the inevitability) of theologies representing
little more than human opinion. In our century, the consequential development
has been:
1. Theological liberalism or modernism: Evolving mankind is
able to save itself through imitating Jesus and engaging in "social
gospel" amelioration of the structures of life.
2. Barthian neo-orthodoxy: Barth recognised modernism's
naYvety in discounting human depravity-a fact brought home by
the World Wars-but continued to accept biblical criticism, thereby
of necessity relegating the miraculous scriptural gospel to the
undemonstrable realm of"suprahistory." (A vain but heroic attempt
to retain the biblical gospel without the historicity of the biblical
text: a classic case of wanting one's cake and eating it too.)
3. Bultmannian existentialism: Owing to the inherent instability
of neo-orthodoxy, the theologian now seeks to ground theology in
personal experience alone. Biblical revelation is "demythologised"
and the Heilsgeschichte is reduced to existential, subjective,
personal encounter.
4. Tillich 's ontologicaltheology: A recognition that existential
experience in fact offers no solid ground for theologising, combined
with a thoroughly unsuccessful attempt to substitute for it
Schelling's idealistic philosophical category of "Being itself."
5. Secular and death-of-God theologies: In the face of the
preceding vain and unworkable endeavours to provide nonrevelational foundations for theology, together with dogmatic
acceptance of the unreliability of the biblical texts, the secular
theologians and death-of-Goders deconstruct theology, transforming
it into little more than a new humanism.
Now we are going to argue that, in the ostensibly independent area of
jurisprudence, a remarkably parallel history of ideological development (or
regression, if you will) can be observed-and for precisely the same underlying
reasons. Concretely, since the underpinnings of scriptural revelation were
removed from natural-law theory in the 18th and early 19th centuries,
jurisprudence has developed along the following lines,2 paralleling in many
2. It will be noted that we concentrate here primarily on the history of modem
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fundamental ways the theological history of ideas just set forth:
1. Classical positivism / Scandinavian and American legal realism
2. The jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart
3. The jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin
4. The neo-Kantian political theorists
5. Critical Legal Studies and jurisprudential deconstructionism
We shall now proceed to chart this history in detail, and, having done so,
draw an important lesson from it.
Il. THE UNNATURAL SHIFT INNATURAL-LAW THEORY

Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, the prevailing philosophy of
law in the Western world was so-called "natural-law" theory. Originating with
the Greeks in classical times (Aristotle; the Stoics), it profoundly influenced the
Roman world (Cicero; Seneca) and was baptised by the great theologians of
medieval Christendom (Augustine; Thomas Aquinas). The essence of the
Greco-Roman position was that the human race benefits from natural, built- in
standards of justice and human laws need to conform to them. To be sure, the
Christian theologians, while fully agreeing on the basis of biblical revelation
that man is created in God's image 3 and has God's law implanted in his heart,4
nonetheless recognised the inadequacy of building simpliciter a legal system
from the conscience of mankind. Thus the Apostle Paul's proclamation to the
Stoic philosophers at Athens that a natural knowledge of God and of morality is
not enough: the unknown god of natural revelation is utterly inadequate without
Jesus Christ. 5 Man, after all, is a fallen creature and his conscience has been
corrupted along with all other aspects of his relationship with his Creator. It
follows that mankind, individually and collectively, needs a specialrevelation
to clarify and correct misinterpretations of the general revelation of which
conscience is one aspect. That special revelation has been provided by grace
alone through the Word-the living Word (Christ) and the written word (the
Holy Scriptures). The Bible-as Luther would later put it, the cradle in which
Christ is offered to us-thus becomes an essential source of knowledge for
jurisprudence in the common-law world rather than dealing with continental European civil- law
jurisprudence (e.g., the influential position of Jirgen Habermas). In point of fact, our basic
thesis could also have been illustrated from continental sources, but the symposiums time
constraints made this impossible. For insights into European philosophy of law today, readers
may wish to consult JAMES E. HERGET, CONTEMPORARY GERMAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1996).
3. See, e.g., Genesis 1.
4. See Romans 1.
5. See Acts 17.
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understanding the true content of natural law and a permanent corrective for
conceptions of it based on conscience alone. Scripture corrects and perfects the
knowledge of ideal law a fallen race derives from nature and conscience.
It is worthwhile for us to hear two primary-source statements of this
Christian approach to natural law; they will serve as an essential point of
reference for what follows. The first comes from DoctorandStudent (full title:
A Dialogue between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student of the Laws of
England), first published in Latin circa 1523; prior to Blackstone's
Commentaries, it served as the leading introduction to the law for fledgling
students. The author, probably Christopher St. Germain of the Inner Temple,
discusses "the law of reason, the which by doctors is called the law of nature of
reasonable creatures," and then proceeds to its correction and extension by way
of "the law of God":
The law of nature specially considered, which is also called the
law of reason, pertaineth only to creatures reasonable, that is, man,
which is created to the image of God.
And this law ought to be kept as well among Jews and Gentiles,
as among christian men: and this law is always good and righteous,
stirring and inclining a man to good, and abhorring evil. And ... it
is written in the heart of every man, teaching him what is to be done,
and what is to be fled; and because it is written in the heart,
therefore it may not be put away, ne it is never changeable by no
diversity of place, ne time: and therefore against this law,
prescription, statute nor custom may not prevail: and if any be
brought in against it, they be not prescriptions, statutes nor customs,
but things void and against justice.
Though the law of reason may not be changed, nor wholly put
away; nevertheless, before the law written, it was greatly lett and
blinded by evil customs, and by many sins of the people, beside our
original sin; insomuch that it might hardly be discerned what was
righteous, and what was unrighteous, and what was good, and what
was evil. Wherefore it was necessary, for the good order of the
people, to have many things added to the law of reason ....
The law of God is a certain law given by revelation to a
reasonable creature, shewing him the will of God, willing that
creatures reasonable be bound to do a thing, or not to do it, for
obtaining of the felicity eternal ... ; as been the laws of the Old
Testament, that been called morals, and the laws ofthe evangelists,
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the which were shewed in much more excellent manner than the law
of the Old Testament was: for that was shewed by the mediation of
an angel; but the law of the evangelists was shewed by the
mediation of our Lord Jesus Christ, God and man. And the law of
God is always righteous and just, for it is made and given after the
will of God. And therefore all acts and deeds of man be called
righteous and just, when they
be done according to the law of God,
6
it.
to
conformable
be
and
Sir William Blackstone, who in his Vinerian lectures of 1758 at Oxford
provided students of the common law in England and America with the first
comprehensive textbook on the subject worthy of the name, develops precisely
the same argument in discussing "the nature of laws in general":
Th[e] law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by
God Himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is
binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times: no
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them
as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately
or immediately, from this original.
But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each
individual, it is still necessary to have recourse to reason: whose
office it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of
nature directs in every circumstance of life; by considering, what
method will tend the most effectually to our own substantial
happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor
before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions,
unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the
task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but
this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience;
that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance
and error.
This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of
divine providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the
imperfection, and the blindness of human reason hath been pleased,
at sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce its
laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus
6. [CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAIN], THE DOCTOR AND STUDENT 5-7 (William Muchall ed.,
1874); cf JURISPRUDENCE: A BOOK OF READINGS 3, 7-22 (John Warwick Montgomery ed.,
1992).
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delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be
found only in the Holy Scriptures. These precepts, when revealed,
are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of
nature, as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But
we are not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these
truths was attainable by reason, in its present corrupted state; since
we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the
wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed
of the same original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic
obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the
revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moral
system, which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the
natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly declared so
to be by God Himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of
human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain
of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal
authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition
together.
Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of
revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws
should be suffered to contradict these.7
But, by Blackstone's time, Deistic scepticism toward revealed religion had
already begun to erode the foundations of his natural-law theory. The Deists
and their continental counterparts (the "philosophes"of the French Revolution
and the so-called Enlightenment) had no problem with a natural law embedded
in human conscience, but they firmly rejected the historic Christian claim to a
controlling special revelation in Scripture. Characteristically, Thomas Paine's
tract, The Age ofReason, not only sets the "Book of Nature" over against the
"Book of Scripture" but devotes its entire second half to listing alleged errors
and contradictions in the Bible, in an effort to destroy its credibility. The
American "Founding Fathers" were deeply influenced by such thinking and
based their concept of natural rights, as did the authors of the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man, on general and not special revelation:
"Nature and Nature's God-not the God of Scripture, the God who in Christ
reconciles the world unto Himself.",8 Result: a Deistic natural-law theory,
7.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4142 (1765-69).

8. See JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, THE SHAPING OF AMERICA 47 (1976). Thomas
Jefferson, for example, could not stand the influence Blackstone (as an orthodox Christian and a
political Tory) had on American students of the law. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THOMAS
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divorced from biblical controls.
Then, by the end of the 19th century, owing to Darwinian "naturalism"
taking the ideological stage-centre, even the Deistic creator-god was dropped
from the scenario, and natural-law theory became entirely anthropocentric.
Mankind was supposed to manifest, on an entirely naturalistic basis, the
required ethical principles--or the ability to arrive at such-which could serve
as an adequate criterion for judging positive law and existing legal systems.
Needless to say, this emasculated form of jusnaturalism was entirely
incapable of delivering what was expected of it. Nineteenth-century
anthropologists were already pointing out the tremendous diversity of
standards, ethical norms, and moral practices in the world's cultures; how was
it possible, then, to sustain the idea of a common human "conscience" adequate
to judge positive legislation? Moreover, even supposing that such a common
standard could be demonstrated, would that make it right? In 1903, English
philosopher G.E. Moore identified as the "naturalistic fallacy" the assumption
that an "is" (here, common ethical beliefs) can be regarded ipsofacto as the
equivalent of an "ought" (here, proper natural law). And the hopeless
generality and lack of specificity of the humanistic natural-law principles made
the viewpoint of little practical utility in the legal field. What assistance could
secular natural-law theory offer to the day-to-day work of the legislator or judge
when it defined true law as "the art of what is good and equitable" (Celsus) or
"the abstract expression of the general will existing in and for itself" (Hegel) or
"the organic whole of the external conditions ofthe intellectual life" (Krause)?9
IV. CLASSICAL LEGAL POSITIVISM OR REALISM

10

Just as social-gospel modernism, based on an unjustifiable confidence in
human nature, overwhelmed traditional, orthodox theology once the latter's
biblical foundations had been eroded, so in the Victorian era a new
jurisprudence easily replaced a natural-law theory which no longer relied upon
Holy Scripture for its ultimate justification. This jurisprudence came to be
known on the European continent as legal positivism, having obvious affinities
with the scientific or sociological positivism of Auguste Comte; in the
common-law world (England and America) it was generally called legal
realism.
JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 9-10 (1978).
9. Cf JOHN CHIPMAN CRAY, THENATURE AND SOURCES OFTHE LAW 88-89, 96-99 (Roland

Cray ed., 2d ed. 1963).
10. For an introduction to the modem schools of legal thought discussed in this paper, the
reader without training in law or jurisprudence may wish to consult Part II of A COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
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The most important influence in the rise of this new movement was
utilitarian philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham, who in turn
provided the oft-regarded "father of legal positivism," John Austin, with many
of his ideas. Bentham wrote a lengthy critique of Blackstone's Commentaries
in which he declared that Blackstone's "natural and imprescriptable rights"
were but "nonsense on stilts." "From the law of nature," cried Bentham, "come
imaginary rights-a bastard brood of monsters."'" Law is not some absolute,
eternal set of principles established in the heavens and known to all men
through conscience; it is, in Austin's words, simply "a creature of the
Sovereign or State.,,12 Law, then, is the commands of the sovereign-no more,
no less.
On the European continent, the Scandinavian legal realists of the twentieth
century (Hdgerstr6m, Olivecrona, Ross) unfurled the Bentham-Austin banner.
Alf Ross, the most influential of the three, asserted in the preface to his work
On Law andJusticethat "the fundamental legal notions must be interpreted as
conceptions of social reality, the behaviour of man in society, and as nothing
else." He went on to "reject the idea of a specific a priori 'validity' which
raises the law above the world of facts" and to embrace a "relativistic spirit" in
jurisprudence. He believed that he was casting aside "ought-propositions" in
favour of simple, empirical "is-propositions." Law for Ross could be
analogised to a game of chess-indeed, reductionistically understood merely in
terms of such social game-playing:
This analysis of a simple model is calculated to raise doubts as to
the necessity of metaphysical explanations of the concept of law.
Who would ever think of tracing the valid norms of chess back to an
a priorivalidity, a pure idea of chess, bestowed upon man by God
or deduced by man's eternal reason? The thought is ridiculous,
because we do not take chess as seriously as law-because stronger
emotions are bound up with the concepts of law. But this is no
reason for believing that logical analysis should adopt a
3
fundamentally different attitude in each of the two cases. '

11.

JEREMY BENTHAM, AnarchicalFallacies,in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 501-02

(John Bowring ed., 1838-43); cf JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY 82 (1995) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY].
12. 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW

550-51 (Robert Campbell ed., 1873); cf R.A. EASTWOOD & G.W. KEETON, THE AUSTINtAN
THEORIES OF LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY (1929); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, THE THOUGHT OF JOHN

AUSTIN (1985).
13. ALF Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE ix-x, 18 (1958).
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The most famous of the continental legal positivists and the one who most fully
took that philosophy to its logical conclusion was the Austrian jurisprudent
Hans Kelsen. He maintained that each legal system is unique and logically
uncriticisable from the outside or from the standpoint ofany other legal system.
A legal system (Stufenbau) will necessarily have a fundamental root principle
grounding it (the Grundnorm) and one cannot subject that basic norm to any
higher standard. In Kelsen's own words: "The search for the reason of a
norm's validity cannot go on indefinitely like the search for the cause of an
effect. It must end with a norm which, as the last and highest, is
presupposed." 14 Law thus constitutes a "coercive order" and is-literally-a
law unto itself. The "first cause" is not a transcendent God but rather a
necessitarian ultimate norm of the human legal system.
American legal realism put (as might be expected) a practical twist to the
notion that law is entirely comprehensible humanistically and sociologically.
Philosophical utilitarians and pragmatists William James and John Dewey
indirectly assisted the development of the jurisprudential realism of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Karl Llewellyn. Holmes coined the famous adage
that the law is nothing more pretentious than "the prophecies ofwhat the courts
will do in fact."1 5 For Llewellyn, law is always "in flux" and a "means to social
ends," and since the society changes faster than the law, the law must
constantly be reexamined to determine how far and how effectively it is in fact
fitting the society. The formal literature of the law (the opinions of the higher
courts, the law reports) are, in his view, after-the-fact "rationalisations,"
for
16
legal decisions in reality are made by the weighing of social needs.
What have been the consequences of legal positivism or realism as a
philosophy of law? It has contributed mightily to unprincipled court decisions
such as Roe v. Wade which are little more than attempts to identify the social
forces in the contemporary society and pander to them: Pilate pragmatically
releasing Barabbas and giving over our Lord to be crucified because of the
pressure of the crowd.' 7

14.

194 (Max Knight trans., 1970); ef JOHN
32 (1975).
15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61
(1897).
16. KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 55 (1962); THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 35-45 (1960).
17. See JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS (1981); John
Warwick Montgomery, The Rights of Unborn Children,5 SIMON GREENLEAF L. REv. 23 (198586), and reprintedin MONTGOMERY ET AL., CHRISTIANS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: LAW, GOSPEL
AND PUBLIC POLICY 175-212 (1996) [hereinafter CHRISTIANS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE].
HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW

WARWICK MONTGOMERY, THE LAW ABOVE THE LAW
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Even more appalling is the fact that without a higher standard to judge legal
systems from the outside, legal positivism can do nothing in the face of the
atrocities brought about by legal systems such as the Stalinist or the Nazi whose
Grundnorm and total social fabric are fundamentally flawed. Indeed, just as
the two World Wars of our century dealt the deathblow to the old religious
modernism, so those same evidences of institutionalised human depravity cut
the ground from under positivistic jurisprudence. As the great Belgian
philosopher of law Chaim Perelman succinctly put it:
This conception ofjuridical positivism collapses before the abuses
of Hitlerism, like any scientific theory irreconcilable with the facts.
The universal reaction to the Nazi crimes forced the Allied chiefs of
state to institute the Nuremberg trials and to interpret the adage
nullum crimen sine lege in a non-positivistic sense because the law
violated in the case did not derive from a system of positive law but
from the conscience of all civilized men. The conviction that it was
impossible to leave these horrible crimes unpunished, although they
fell outside a system of positive law, has prevailed over the
positivistic conception of the grounding of the law.' 8
V. HART AND DWORKIN
The weaknesses of classical legal positivism have understandably led to
energetic efforts at refining or redoing that jurisprudence to make it less
problematic and vulnerable to criticism. In many respects, the work of H.L.A.
Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and the neo-Kantian political philosophers such as John
Rawls and Alan Gewirth remind us of the endeavours of Barth, Bultmann, and
Tillich to create a meaningful theology after the collapse of the old modernism
while still maintaining its position that the Bible is incapable of serving as a
trustworthy historical revelation.
H.L.A. Hart, late professor of jurisprudence at Oxford, recognised that the
Austinian-Benthamite command theory of law was inadequate. He therefore
saw the need to talk about a "minimum content of natural law": on semisociological premises, he argues that all law must take into account five basic
facts about human nature: human vulnerability, approximate equality of
strength and intellect, limited altruism, limited resources (e.g., food, shelter),
18. Chaim Perelman, Can the Rights of Man Be Founded?,in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 47 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1980); see also John

Warwick Montgomery, Law and Justice, in GoD AND CAESAR 319-41 (Michael Bauman &
David Hall eds., 1994), and reprintedin CHRIsTIANs IN TI-E PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 17, at

133-50.
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and limited understanding and strength of will.' 9
It will be observed, however, that these five considerations are purely
descriptive, not normative, and thus are not the equivalent functionally of
traditional natural-law theory. What happens, for example, when one of the
facts (say, human vulnerability) conflicts with another (say, limited resources)?
Which ought to prevail? Without genuine, extrinsic norms, Hart cannot tell us.
Hart correctly sees that the Austinian notion of all law being direct
commands is in fact hopelessly simplistic. Many genuine laws do not function
that way at all (e.g., in the realms of constitutional and procedural law). He
therefore stressed that not only is there a direct application of law by way of
what he calls "primary rules," but also there are "secondary rules" which
determine ultimately what goes into the system and whether and how the
system can be changed. Hart identified three kinds of "secondary rules": the
rule of change; the rule of adjudication; and-most important-the rule of
recognition, by which decisions are made as to what is and what is not a true
part of the legal system.
But though Hart was a practical English thinker, lacking Kelsen's Germanic,
metaphysical temperament, he remained a positivist to the end: his rule of
recognition has the same ultimate limitation as Kelsen's Grundnorm. The rule
of recognition at the root of a given legal system stands above and beyond
extrinsic criticism. One can criticise the lesser rules in the system for their lack
of conformity with that rule, but since each legal system exists sui generis,
there is no way to question the system's rule of recognition itself. To use
Hart's own analogy, it is like the standard metre bar in Paris, by which all metre
sticks are measured: there is no sense in asking if it itselfis of the right length.2 °
And so Hart's rehabilitation of classical command-theory remains hobbled
by its fundamental notion that no eternal principles exist to judge legal systems,
making them of necessity relativistic and their foundations arbitrary. One
thinks of Karl Barth-desperately trying to restore the essential themes of sin
and grace to a denuded modernistic theology, but unable to succeed in principle
because he could not bring himself to reject modernism's higher criticism of
the Bible.21
The most recent attempt to refine, and indeed go beyond, classical positivism
has been offered by Ronald Dworkin, an American who is H.L.A. Hart's
successor as professor of jurisprudence at Oxford. Dworkin takes Hart's
positivism a step further. He says: to understand a legal system, you cannot
19. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-207 (1961).
20. Id. at 105-06.
21. JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, Karl Barth andContemporaryTheology ofHistory,in
JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, WHERE IS HISTORY GOING? 100-17 (1972).

HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 872 2007-2008

A TALE OFIDEOLOGICAL COLLAPSE

2008]

even stop with rules; you must go on from rules, primary and secondary, to
principles. What does he mean by "principles"? Rules, he notes, are all-ornothing, whereas the principles behind the rules "incline" toward particular
legal results. Illustration: the legalprinciplethat no-one must profit from his or
her own wrong. That is not all-or-nothing. Why? Because of the rule of
adverse possession (often wryly called "legal theft")-the rule that says that if
you can occupy in an open, uninterrupted, and hostile manner for a sufficient
length of time a particular piece of land under the conditions the common law
sets forth, you may obtain the legal title or interest to it. In such an instance,
you will profit from your own wrong. So, behind the rules there lie general
principles, inclining to but not forcing particular legal consequences.
And where, pray tell, do these fundamental principles come from? Here,
Dworkin introduces the ideal judge-a kind of Platonic philosopher-king in
judicial garb. Judge Hercules develops the needed principles in the course of
his judicial activity. Writes Dworkin:
You will now see why I call our judge Hercules. He must construct
a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a coherent
justification for all common law precedents and, so far as these are
to be justified on principle, constitutional and statutory provisions as
well.22
How does the godlike Hercules find these essential principles? Dworkin
offers the following (may we say: hopelessly inadequate) account:
We could not devise any formula for testing how much and
what kind of institutional support is necessary to make a principle a
legal principle, still less to fix its weight at a particular order of
magnitude. We argue for a particular principle by grappling with a
whole set of shifting, developing and interacting standards
(themselves principles rather than rules) about institutional
responsibility, statutory interpretation, the persuasive force of
various sorts of precedent, the relation of all these to contemporary
moral practices, and hosts of other such standards.23
The net, to put it mildly, is thrown very widely here-with no more
assurance that true principles will be preserved from the sociological voxpopuli
than we found in American legal realism.
Dworkin argues for "law as integrity," and by this he means evenhandedness and consistency of application. He points out that we would never
22. RONALD

DwoRriN,

TAKING

RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

116-17 (1977).

23. Id. at40-41.
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stand for "checkerboard" legal approaches such as resolving the pro-life, prochoice conflict by making abortion criminal for pregnant women born in even
years but not for those born in odd years.2 4 Agreed: but Dworkin gives us no
adequate, principled answer as to whether abortion per se is right or wrong.25
And one can have even-handedness and consistency in the most damnable legal
systems. Nazi law was quite even-handed and consistent: all Jews were to
wear the yellow
star and none of them could, for example, hold a position of
26
public trust.

Dworkin's philosophy of law, in spite of its merit in providing insights well
beyond those of the positivists and realists who preceded him, still leaves us
without the substantive criteria needed to judge the adequacy of any given
expression of positive law. He sees that traditional positivism fails in that
respect, and he clearly longs for more solid, principled grounds for legal
decision-making. His amorphous principles, however, and the mystical
functioning of his ideal judge, Hercules, remind us a bit of Rudolf Bultmann,
whose reaction to Barthian inadequacies was to turn what should have been a
theology of objective, revelatory truth (Luther's "the entire gospel is extra
nos") into a confused mess of existential, subjective pottage. 27
VI. THE NEO-KANTIANS, CLS, AND JURISPRUDENCE DECONSTRUCTED

In the face of existential theology's inability to arrive at any objective
principles, Paul Tillich went back to Schelling and rationalistic ontology in his
vain search for extra-biblical theological foundations. Similarly, the most
influential political philosophers and rights analysts of our time (John Rawls,
Alan Gewirth) have attempted to develop along neo-Kantian lines a substitute
for discredited natural-law theories and inadequate positivisms.
24. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986). A further collection of Dworkin's
essays is published under the title Freedom's Law. RONALDDWORKIN,FREEDOM'SLAW (1996).
25. See Dworkin's treatment of the abortion issue in his book, Life's Dominion. RONALD
DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993). I have critiqued his non-solution in my article New Light
on the Abortion Controversy? See John Warwick Montgomery, New Light on the Abortion
Controversy?, 60 NEW OxFORD REv. 24 (1993).
26. See, e.g., LES LOIS DE VICHY (Dominique Rrmy ed., 1992); VINCENT DE MORO-GAFFERI
& PIERRE COT, LE DROIT NATIONAL-SOCIALISTE, preface de Pierre Cot (1936); INGO MOLLER,
HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH, (D.L. Schneider trans., 1991); EDITH ROPER
& CLARA LEISER, SKELETON OF JUSTICE (1941); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE
HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996).
27. Cf JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, Luther's Hermeneutic vs. the New Hermeneutic,in
JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, IN DEFENSE OF MARTIN LUTHER 40-85 (1970).
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Both Rawls and Gewirth have given expression to treating persons as equals
in terms of variant interpretations of Kantian universalizability. Gewirth has
followed Kant more literally: he has argued that ethical reasoning, as such, is
marked by a certain phenomenology-namely, in reasoning ethically, an agent
abstracts from her or his particular ends, and thinks in terms of what general
requirements for rational autonomy the agent would demand for the self (so
idealized) on the condition that the requirements be consistently extended to all
other agents alike. Rawls's argument is more abstract but to similar effect: we
start not from the particular agent, but from the concept of rational persons who
must unanimously agree upon, while under a veil of ignorance as to who they
are, the general critical standards in terms of which their personal relations will
be governed. For Rawls, the veil of ignorance performs the same function as
Gewirth's abstraction of the agent from her or his ends (in thinking ethically,
one respects higher-order capacities of personhood, not lower-ends which
happen to be pursued); and, the contractual agreement is the functional equivalent of Gewirth's universalization (what all persons would agree to comes to the
same thing as what any person, suitably idealized, would demand for one's self
on the condition that it be extended to all alike). Now, importantly, both these
theories appeal to consequences in arguing that certain substantive principles
would be universalized (Gewirth) or agreed to (Rawls). Thus, Gewirth has
argued that the universalizing agent would assess the necessary substantive or
material conditions for rational autonomy and would universalize those
conditions; the consequences of universalization thus importantly determine
what would be universalized. Correspondingly, Rawls's contractors consider
the consequences of agreeing to certain standards of conduct as part of their
deliberations.28
For Rawls, human beings placed under the 'veil of ignorance' as to their
special advantages will, by rationalistic necessity, arrive at his two fundamental
Principles of Justice (embracing civil and social rights) and thus establish a
rationally-sound political and legal order.29 In Gewirth's case, this same result
is supposedly achieved by a modem argument paralleling Kant's assertion of
his Categorical Imperative ("act only on that maxim which you can will to be a
universal law"): human beings, as purposive agents, require freedom and wellbeing to function, so they must rationally concede such freedom and well-being
(i.e., fundamental civil and social rights) to others as well. Result: ajust legal
28. David A.J. Richards, Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive
CriminalLaw, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395, 1411-12 (1979).
29. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972); JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(1993); John Rawls, Reply to Habermas,92 J. PUIL. 132 (1995).
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and political order.3 °
Robert Paul Wolff, author of one of the most penetrating examinations of
Rawls's philosophy, identifies the central fallacy in all such rationalisms.
Even if Rawls's theorem can be established, the self-interested
moral skeptic may still decline to make a once-and-for-all
commitment, even to a principle chosen from self-interest. Fidelity
to principle is not, after all, deducible from bare formal rationality.3'
This strikes equally at Rawls and at Gewirth-and likewise at Robert
Nozick 32 and at all others relying on neo-Kantian rationalistic assumptions.
People simply do not have to act rationally; they do not have to exercise
"fidelity to principle" even when the principle can be shown to be formally
logical.
Why is this? Because of original sin: the radical self-centredness which
fallen mankind displays. Unregenerate people generally refuse to function
under a "veil of ignorance" or on the basis of a rational principle of
universalisation or "generic consistency" when the result would be to their own
selfish disadvantage. Like the secular natural-law thinkers of the eighteenth
century upon whom Rawls and Gewirth try to improve (note, for example,
Rawls's use of Enlightenment contract-theory as a model), the modem neoKantians blissfully disregard the fact of human depravity. Their political and
ideological structures thus lack the very necessitarian character for which they
were built. As jurisprudential towers of Babel, they not only do not reach to
heaven; they produce confusion of thought.33
And when in an intellectual discipline even the most ambitious efforts to
reach solid ground fail-what then? The history of contemporary theology
offers a pregnant illustration. When Tillich's "Being itself' collapsed into
either pantheism or analytical meaninglessness (your choice!), the direct
consequences were "secular theology" and the death-of-God movement.34 And
in philosophy of law, the conspicuous lack of success of the neo-Kantian
30. ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 16-20 (1996).
31. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF
"A THEORY OF JUSTICE" 20 (1977).
32. Cf ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY (1993).
33. For a more detailed critique, see HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY supranote 11, at
92-98, 182-84. Deryck Beyleveld's herculean effort to vindicate Gewirth's principle of generic
consistency is, sad to say, a failure, for it ignores the impact of human depravity on all
rationalistic moral systems. See DERYCK BEYLEVELD, THE DIALECTICAL NECESSITY OF
MORALrT (1991).
34. John Warwick Montgomery, A Philosophical-TheologicalCritiqueofthe Death of God
Movement, in THE MEANING OF THE DEATH OF GOD 25-69 (Bernard Murchland ed., 1967).
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thinkers to provide an adequate foundation for jurisprudence-against the
background of the failures of secular natural-law thinking and the amorality of
legal positivism-has produced the deconstructivist Critical Legal Studies
movement.
CLS, as it is popularly known, appeared on the American law school scene
in the 1970s; it has since become an important influence in British legal
education as well. The two most noteworthy advocates of the position are
Roberto Unger and Duncan Kennedy, whose emphases and concerns, while
differing in certain respects, are fundamentally the same. 35 These thinkers
build upon the pragmatic, social orientation of American legal realism, and
carry to a far greater extreme Llewellyn's view that formal legal judgments are
little more than rationalisations of social practice. For CLS, the law is to be
viewed from the standpoint of radical skepticism: all legal judgment is a matter
of choosing one set of values over another. That being so, the purpose of legal
activity is not a search for principles ofjustice embedded in and developed by
the legal tradition, but the conscious advancement of a political vision. The law
is inherently indeterminate; its literature has no single and objective meaning,
being capable of virtually any interpretation; legal principles are contradictory;
indeed, the law, in the final analysis, is but a tool generally serving the interests
of the powerful and the maintenance of the status quo. So convinced advocates
of CLS will follow the approach of critical neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci 36 and
endeavour to destabilise the liberal legal culture in favour of those it sees as
oppressed. Indeed, even the Rule of Law itself and civil or human rights are
suspect and must not be accepted uncritically-for these ideals encourage the
fiction that people are in fact treated equally under the law, whereas in our
modem "liberal" societies the law actually functions as a lid on the garbage can
of an inequitable social system favouring those who control it.
The affmities of CLS with radical Marxism are obvious; less apparent is its
dependence on Herbert Marcuse's "critique of pure tolerance," an important
theoretical source of the student revolutionary movements of the 1960s. 37 One
35. On CLS, see THE CRITICAL LAWYERS' HANDBOOK (Ian Grigg-Spali & Paddy Ireland
eds., 1992); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Fitzpatrick & Alan Hunt eds., 1987); MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT,

REVOLUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN (Anthony Carty ed., 1990); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE
CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Tibor R. Machan, How CriticalIsCriticalLegal
Studies?, 1 ACAD. QUESTIONS 54-64 (1988).
36. For a careful treatment of Gramsci's life and ideas, see ALASTAm DAVIDSON, ANTONIO
GRAMSCI: TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (1977).
37. JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, Marcuse, in THE SUICIDE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY,

supra note 1,at 209-12; see also John Warwick Montgomery, The Marxist Approach to Human
Rights: Analysis & Critique,3 SIMON GREENLEAF L. REV. 1 (1983-84).
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could, of course, engage in systematic critique of CLS's self-defeating
deconstructivism, pointing out, as has legal philosopher J.W. Harris, that "the
thought of vanguard lawyers armed with real destabilisation power conjures up
nightmare visions of re-education camps." 38 But all we wish to do here is to
emphasize that CLS in the realm of jurisprudence functions precisely as do
"secular theology" and the death-of-God movement in the theological sphere: it
constitutes an intellectual and spiritual dead-end. Beyond it there be not even
dragons, only silence. For the theory has cannibalistically eaten up the very
subject-matter which it was supposed to explain and justify.
Is there a common cause for these parallel deteriorations in modem
jurisprudence and contemporary theology? To me it seems quite evident that
the two spheres share at least one common feature. Both theology and law
purport to deal with values: theology, with a transcendent God, the same
yesterday, today, and forever, whose eternal will mankind needs to know and
obey for everlasting felicity; law, with genuine and inalienable standards of
justice. But in neither case can the relativistic human situation give rise to the
absolute values sought. Out of flux, nothing but flux. Theology, therefore,
necessarily engages in a process of self-destruction when it leaves aside the
only verifiable revelation Cod has ever provided to a sinful race, the Holy
Scriptures. To build a theology on any other foundation than that of God's
Word is to build on sand.
And legal philosophy has an equal need for the God of the universe to
declare, once for all and uncontaminated by human sin and fallibility, the true
principles for the ordering of human society so that law can be conformed to
justice and righteousness. By setting biblical revelation aside, natural-law
theories destroyed themselves, and no amount of human speculation since has
been able to rectify the lOSS. 3 9 A fallen race will not find or be able to sustain
intelligent jurisprudential design without listening to the Intelligent Designer.
But listening how? and where?
God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in
time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last
38. J.W. Harris, Legal Doctrine and Interests in Land, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 197 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987).
39. This applies also, sadly, to John Finnis's original rethinking of natural-law theory. See
JOHN FINNIS, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHics (1983); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS (1980). Although a Roman Catholic Christian, Finnis's reconstruction of natural-law

theory takes place within the secular, humanistic frame of reference: special revelation is not
appealed to and Finnis declares that his work "offers a rather elaborate sketch of a theory of
natural law without needing to advert to the question of God's existence or nature or will." See
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra at 49, 371-410.
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days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir
of all things, by whom also he made the worlds; who being the
brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person,
and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he
had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of
the Majesty on high .... Unto the Son he saith, Thy throne,
O God, is for ever and ever: a sceptre of righteousness is the
sceptre of thy kingdom.40

40. Hebrews 1:1-3, 8; cf JOHN WARWICK MONTGOMERY, LAW AND MORALITY: FRIENDS OR
FOES? AN INAUGURAL LECTURE (1994); John Warwick Montgomery, Law and Christian
Theology: Some FoundationalPrinciples, 2 CHRISTIAN LEGAL J. [Canada] 24-31 (1993),
reprintedin CHRISTIANS IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 17, at 117-32; and JOHN WARWICK
MONTGOMERY, LAW AND MORALITY: FRIENDS OR FOES? AN INAUGURAL LECTURE (1994).
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